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A Test of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect 
Applied to Chinese Regional Data 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we investigate the relevance of the Balassa-Samuelson effect to the 
determination of regional inflation in China, for the period 1985 – 2000.  To do this, 
we first construct annual measures of Chinese inflation and industry input on regional 
and sectoral basis.  Then we generalize the Asea and Mendoza (1994) settings to 
consider asymmetric productivity shocks across sectors.  Testing this model on 
Chinese Regional Data aid of non-stationary panel data techniques, it shows that our 
extended theoretical model is a good empirical representation of the Chinese data 
which supports the Balassa-Samuelson effect.  Moreover, we are able to test the Asea 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main proposition of the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 
1964) is that high productivity growth of the tradable sector compared to the non-
tradable sector leads to a rise in the relative price of nontradables, which puts upward 
pressure on a country’s real exchange rate.  Previous empirical analysis of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect can be broadly broken into two groups.  The first group of 
literature is static in nature and examines the major components of theory 
straightforwardly (see, in particular, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 1999; Chinn 2000; 
Drine and Rault 2002, 2003; Marston 1990; Micossi and Milesi-Ferretti 1994; Strauss 
1995; Vikas and Ogaki 1999).  The second group is concerned with intertemporal 
equilibrium model incorporating nontradables, which, in general, specifies production 
and consumption in the context of intertemporal optimization.  In such a strand of 
literature, Chinn (1995) and (1996), De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), Froot and Rogoff 
(1991), Obstfeld (1993), and Rogoff (1992) adopt the unbalanced growth framework 
and examine the time series implication of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.   On the 
other hand, Asea and Mendoza (1994) propose a model with balanced growth features 
and are concerned with the cross-sectional impact of the theory.    Our analysis 
extends the Asea and Mendoza (1994) approach and differs from them in that we 
model the two-country and two-sector world where shocks to technologies are 
heterogeneous across sectors.   
 
For the empirical analysis, we turn to a Regional Data set for China which has been 
especially constructed for this work.  The reason why estimation based on regional 
data is interesting for China lies in the fact that the inflation and productivity trends   4
across Chinese regions have varied enormously.
1   Such diversity would make it rather 
difficult to apply time series methods to aggregated data.  The central contribution of 
our study is the construction of a large disaggregate database on China.  And so the 
details of the data and the construction of the empirical counterparts to the theoretical 
variables merit some discussion (additional details are in Part 3).  China is composed 
of twenty-two provinces (Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, 
Shanxi, Shaanxi, Shandong, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang), five autonomous 
regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet), four municipalities 
(Beijing, Chongqing,
2 Shanghai, and Tianjin), and two special administrative regions 
(Hong Kong and Macau).  Hong Kong and Macau are not within our scope of study 
due to different political and administrative systems compared to mainland China.  
The data for Chongqing have been integrated with those for Sichuan due to the lack of 
data before 1997.  Thus, our sample consists of thirty regions in total.  The data are 
yearly in frequency, for the period 1985 – 2000.  The real exchange rate is defined as 
the bilateral real exchange rate between each region of China and the United States, 
adjusted to the difference in the GDP deflators of each Chinese region and the United 
States.  The prices of tradables and nontradables are proxied by the GDP deflator for 
the Chinese agriculture and industry, and for “other,” which includes construction, 
transportation, storage, postal and telecommunications services, wholesale, retail trade, 
and catering services.
3  These data are calculated as the ratio of the nominal to real 
                                                 
1 For example, from 1992 to 1999, the average annual rates of variation for consumer price index (CPI) 
have ranged from 8.1% in Hainan to 11.5% in Beijing.  Over the decade of the 1990s, total inflation in 
Beijing exceeds that in Hainan by 40% (Guillaumont Jeanneney and Hua, 2002).    
2 Chongqing was formerly (until 14 March 1997) a sub-provincial city within Sichuan province. 
3 The tradable and nontradable categorization is on the basis of De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) criterion, 
which is discussed in more detail in Part 3.     5
GDP index, both at 2000 constant price for each sector and region.  Attempting a 
procedure for calculating sectoral productivity is a difficult enterprise. Previous 
analyses of productivity-based models of the real exchange rate have employed labour 
productivity,
4  which is calculated as GDP per hour worked, or, the total factor 
productivity (TFP)
5 computed as the Solow residuals.  As De Gregorio, Giovannini, 
and Krueger (1994) show, the use of labour productivity might be tainted by the 
demand effects, such as labour shedding, or, the unadjustment process for part-time 
workers especially in the agricultural sector (Chinn 2000).  In this study, we use the 
TFP approach constructed from the real GDP, capital stock, employment,
6 and factor 
returns for each sector.
7  The output, employment, and wage rate necessary to the 
construction of factor returns are drawn from the China Statistical Yearbooks (CSYB).   
The capital stocks are approximated through investment data, which are also from 
CSYB.  
 
In this paper, we test the Asea and Mendoza (1994) version of our general model on 
the Chinese Regional Data, using recently developed non-stationary panel data 
methods.  The results show that eq. (I) of our extended model is a reasonable 
empirical representation of the Chinese Balassa-Samuelson effect.   Thus, we are able 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Bergstrand (1991), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1999), Froot and Rogoff (1991), 
Hsieh (1982), and Marston (1987). 
5 See, for example, Chinn (1995), Chinn and Johnston (1996), De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Krueger 
(1994), and De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994). 
6 Due to the lack of data for labour hours, we follow most studies and use the total employment data as 
a proxy.   
7 However, interpreting the change in TFP as exogenous supply shocks is problematic.  (Evans 1992) 
shows that measured Solow residuals are Granger caused by money, interest rate, and government 
expenditure.  Also, the reliability of the TFP is likely to be affected by mis-estimates of the capital 
stock and labour shares.   
   6
to test the Asea and Mendoza (1994) model restrictions relative to our more general 
model and these restrictions are rejected.    
  
Our study is organized as follows.  Part 1 is the introductory section.  Part 2 describes 
the general equilibrium model that motivates our empirical tests.  Part 3 presents the 
data and variable constructions.  Part 4 summarizes our empirical evidence.  Part 5 
concludes.  
 
2. THE BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
APPROACH 
The main theoretical framework on which we base our empirical work is the two-
country and two-sector general equilibrium analysis first proposed by Asea and 
Mendoza (1994).  The original work focuses on the long-run balanced growth, 
assuming that the productivity shocks follow transitory deviations from the steady-
state growth path.
8   We argue that the productivity shifters, and so the TFPs, are 
heterogeneous across sectors in a real world situation.  In what follows, we first 
briefly review the Balassa-Samuelson framework.  Then we extend the Asea and 
Mendoza (1994) settings to consider a more general assumption on technologies.   
 
2A. The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
In the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, high growth is made possible by high 
productivity growth, with differential sectoral growth rates that cause the inflation 
differentials among sectors.  The relative price of nontradables is expected to rise 
faster in countries with faster growth, since the differential in inflation rates have to 
                                                 
8 As a result, the sectoral random disturbances to technologies cancel each other out in the closed-form 
solutions of the relative price.     7
widen to make the overall growth rate higher (Ito, Isard, and Symansky 1997).  In a 
schematic way, there are three major components of the Balassa-Samuelson theory.  
The first is that a faster increase of tradable sector productivity than of nontradable 
ones leads to an increase in relative price of nontradables.  The second is that the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds for tradable goods.  The third component, which 
is based on the previous two assumptions, says that high productivity growth of the 
tradable sector comparing to the nontradable sector causes a rise in the relative price 
of nontradables, which puts upward pressure on a country’s real exchange rate.   
 
2B. The Firms 
Suppose that there are two industries in the economy, each containing a large number 
of homogeneous firms, producing tradable (T) and nontradable (N) goods subject to 
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N T i , = .  The production function has standard neoclassical properties.  It is concave 
and twice continuously differentiable, satisfies the Inada conditions and implies that 
both factors of production are essential.   
 
Let us denote the flow of leisure hours as L.  The domestic labour market is in 
                                                 
9 For the economy to grow at a constant rate, technological progress must take the labour-augmenting 
form (Solow 1956).     8
equilibrium ex-ante where 
N T N N L + = − 1 .  Labour is internationally immobile but 
can migrate instantaneously between sectors within the economy.  There is, however, 
no economy-wide resource constraint for capital comparable to the labour constraint.   
The evolution of capital is:  t t t I K K + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ , where the investment  t I  is  the 
amount of current output stored for use in the production in the next period; δ  is the 
rate of deprecation.    
   
The assumption of perfect mobility of labour across sectors ensures that the wage 
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The relative price expression (1) we obtain is an extended version of eq. (27) in Asea 
and Mendoza (1994).   
 
2C. The Households 
We assume that the economy consists of infinitely lived consumers, who maximize 





t L C C
Max
, ,








t L C C U D E ∑
∞
=
,         





D  is the discount factor, 0<D<1, ρ  is   9




t L C C U is the instantaneous utility;
10 
T
t C  and 
N
t C  
are the consumption expenditures on tradable and nontradable goods, respectively, 
subject to the budget constraint:  
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11  
where we take the tradable goods as the numeraire, with a common price of one in 
each of two countries, home (H) and foreign (F); the nontradable goods have distinct 
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share of the composite consumption and 0<Ω<1.  The specifications of the utility functions 
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tt U CC  allow us to obtain some specific form of the instantaneous utility 
such that  ( ,, )
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t L C C
, where σ >0 is the inverse 
of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution. 
11 In the absence of the government sector, the representative households’ consumption expenditures 
are financed by the value of total output minus investment plus net foreign assets.  In addition, the 
assumption of perfect international capital mobility means that resources can always be borrowed 
abroad and turned into domestic capital.  Thus, the total real returns paid to the households include the 
ones on the capital stock in the foreign tradable sector.   
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home and foreign prices; an asterisk denotes the foreign country; 
i
t r  is the real interest 
rate; 
i
t w  is the real wage rate; γ  is the nominal interest rate;  t R  is the inverse of the 
real gross rate of return paid on international bonds;  t b   is the net foreign assets 
accumulated by the households. 
 
2D. Competitive Equilibrium and Relative Price 
The Lagrangean maximization problem with respect to 
T
t C  and 
T
t C 1 +  yields:   
1 1
1
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through differentiating the Lagrangean with respect to  1,1 1 1 ,,
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By substituting eq. (3) - (6) into (2), one can see the following equilibrium conditions: 
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From eq. (8) and (10), it follows that in a deterministic stationary equilibrium with 
perfect sectoral capital mobility, the marginal product of capital in the tradable and 















α =− .  If we incorporate this equilibrium condition into our relative 
price expression (1), we further generate:  
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The expressions (11) and (12) we obtain are extended versions of the relative price 
equations (see Asea and Mendoza 1994: p.251-252 for comparison) due to our 
generalized assumptions on productivity shifters.   
 
2E. The long-run real exchange rate 
Suppose that the representative households have the constrained budget minimization 
problem for unit utility: 
,
T N
t t C C
Min
T TN N
t tt t UCP c P c =+, subject to:  
1
( ,) [ ( ) ( 1 ) () ]
TN T N
tt t t Uc c c c
μμ μ
−
−− =Ω + − Ω  = 1, where UC is the budget of the household 
for obtaining one unit of utility; 
T
t c  and 
N
t c  are the shares of one unit composite utility.  
The first order conditions generate the following costs function: 
UC=
11 1




μ μμ μ μ
+
++ ++ Ω+ − Ω .  In the perfect competitive equilibrium, the 
unit cost of obtaining the composite consumption goods equals the price of the goods.  
Hence, in the long-run, the price of the goods should take the form of: 
11 1
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By substituting the price equation into the real exchange rate expression  t e  with  t q  
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where * denotes the foreign country.  Multiplying the numerator and denominator of 
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where in the Balassa and Samuelson framework it is assumed that the PPP holds for 
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t p .  Eq. (14) demonstrates that 
home’s real exchange rate against foreign depends only on the internal relative prices 
of nontradable goods.   
 
2F. Regression Equations 
Referring back to eq. (1), (11), (12), and (14), we can transform them into panel 
regression equations, respectively, as:  
N
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For eq. (I), since labour productivity is a monotonic transformation of the capital-
output ratio,
12 the relative price of nontradable goods is in line with the relative labour 
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, which is  2 δ , needs to be 
negative, if the Balassa-Samuelson effect holds.   
 




jt θ θ −  should be 
positive if the theory holds.  Alternatively, we may estimate eq. (I) directly.  The 
theory requires  3 δ  and  4 δ  to be positive and negative, respectively.  By the same 
reasoning, we would expect that  2 γ  in eq. (II), to be positive, and  3 γ , to be negative.  
Also,  2 η  and  3 η , both in eq. (III), need to be positive and negative respectively. 
 
Following Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1983) and Stockman and Tesar (1995),
13 we 
assume that tradables are relatively labour intensive, that is,  T N αα > .  Then, under 
such a condition, both  1 γ  and  1 η  should be negative.   
 
The theory suggests that the real exchange rate and relative price differential between 
























) ( ) ( ,  N T i , = . 
13 They find that labour’s share of the income generated in the tradable sector is greater than that in the 
nontradable sector in their sample.    14
home and foreign countries are negatively correlated.
14  Hence, the coefficient on 
relative price differential, which is  1 ζ  in eq. (IV), is expected to be negative. 
15 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION    
Our main contribution to the literature is the construction of a large sectoral database 
for industrial analysis, which is primarily based on the China Statistical Yearbook, and 
includes eighteen fundamental variables, ten intermediate ones, and final eight 
variables across five sectors and thirty regions in China.  Therefore the details of the 
data and the construction of the empirical counterparts to the theoretical variables 
should be put more in relief. 
 
The nominal exchange rate is the annual average rate that is calculated based on 
monthly averages, in Chinese RMB yuan per U.S. dollar, from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS).  Following such a definition, a decrease in the 
nominal exchange rate implies appreciation.  The real exchange rate is defined as the 
bilateral real exchange rate between each region of China and the United States, 
adjusted to the difference in the GDP deflators of each region and the United States.  
The regional GDP deflator is the ratio of nominal to real GDP index (2000=1000)
16 
for each region.   
    
We follow De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) classification scheme, which classify sectors 
on the basis of export shares in output for the whole sample of regions with a cut-off 
                                                 
14 A fall in home’s real exchange rate against foreign implies appreciation due to the way we define the 
nominal exchange rate.  
15 Eq. (IV) has been empirically examined by, in particular, Chinn (2000) for Asia Pacific countries, 
and Vikas and Ogaki (1999) for several exchange rates.  
16 The real GDP index is obtained through the GDP index with the preceding year treated as 100.   15
point of 10% to delineate nontradables.  The 10% threshold classifies the Chinese 
agriculture (farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery) and industry 
(excavation, manufacturing, production and supply of power, gas, and water) as the 
tradable sector, and the remaining construction, transportation, storage, postal and 
telecommunications services, wholesale, retail trade, and catering services as the 
nontradable sector.  
 
The sectoral prices (2000=100) for each region are the ratio of the nominal to real 
GDP index,
17 both at 2000 constant prices for each sector and region.  The relative 
price differential is calculated as the difference in the relative prices of each Chinese 
region and the United States.  
 
The TFPs are constructed from real GDP, capital stock, employment, and factor 
returns.  The gross output value is the sum of the current value of final products 
produced in a given sector during a given period with the value of intermediate goods 
double counted (CSYB).  Due to the lack of data on sectoral capital stock, all total 
capital is approximated through investment,
18 except the one for industry from 1993 
to 2002, which is available and refers to “the capital received by the industrial 
enterprises from investors that could be used as operational capitals for a long period” 
(CSYB).  Total employment, according to the definition given by the CSYB, is “the 
                                                 
17  The sectoral GDP index (2000=100) is calculated through the real index of GDP (preceding 
year=100) in tradable and nontradable sectors, which is obtained using the fractions representing the 
composition of overall GDP and real GDP index by region and by individual sector. 
18 Investment is the capital construction investment in “new projects, including construction of a new 
facility, or an addition to an existing facility, and the related activities of the enterprises, institutions or 
administrative units mainly for the purpose of expanding production activity, covering only projects 
each with a total investment of 500,000 RMB yuan and over” (CSYB). 
   16
number of staff and workers, which refers to a literal translation of the Chinese term 
‘zhigong’ that includes employees of state-owned units in urban and rural areas 
(including government agencies), of collective-owned units in urban areas, of other 
ownership units in urban areas, and of state-collective joint ownership.”  Wages 
necessary to the construction of factor returns are the total wage bills of staffs and 
workers, which are also drawn from CSYB. 
 
On the basis of the current OECD’s STructural ANalysis (STAN) industry list, the De 
Gregorio and Wolf (1994) 10% threshold classifies the U.S. agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, total manufacturing, electricity, gas, and 
water supply sectors as tradables, and the remaining construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage, and communication sectors as 
nontradables.  The U.S. tradable and nontradable price deflators are constructed by 
dividing the nominal value added by the real value added (2000=100) for each sector, 
as reported in OECD’s Annual National Accounts – Main Aggregates under the code 
VALU and VALUK respectively.   
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we employ recently developed non-stationary panel data techniques 
that allow us to test the extended Asea and Mendoza (1994) model on Chinese 
Regional Data.  
 
4A. Static panel data estimation  
Tables 1 - 8 provide the estimates of eq. (I), (II), (III) and (IV) based on the pooled 
regression, OLS on differences, the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) regression 
using individual dummies in the OLS regression, the within estimates replacing y and   17
W by subtracting the means of each time series, the between estimates replacing y and 
W by the individual means, the feasible generalised least squares (GLS) estimates 
replacing y and W by deviations from weighted time means, the GLS using OLS 
residuals, and the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) obtained by iterating the 
GLS procedure (Baltagi 1995).
19 
 
Among these static panel models, the Balassa-Samuelson proposition is supported by 
the data in the Total, LSDV, within-groups, GLS using within/between groups, GLS 
using OLS residuals, and MLE models of eq. (I) and (IV) – all coefficients are 
statistically significant and of the expected signs.  When looking at the outputs for eq. 
(I), the magnitudes of the sectoral TFP coefficients suggest that the data is able to 
support our extended model in that the homogeneity restrictions on TFPs across 
sectors, are rejected.  One thing that we should be aware of is that the residuals in 
those regressions do not pass the diagnostic tests so well – they all fail the AR(1) test, 
however, they do not pass the AR(2) tests.    
 
When estimating eq. (II), in six out of the eight cases, the coefficients of the sectoral 
TFPs, that is,  2 γ  and  3 γ , are significant and of the correct signs.  However, the 
coefficient of the tradable capital-output ratio,  1 γ , remains positive in almost all cases, 
                                                 
19 The linear model is given by:  jt j t jt jt v x y + + + = η λ γ '   ) ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 ( T t J j = = , where  t λ  is 
the time effect,  j η  is the fixed individual effect,  jt x  is a  1 × k  vector of time-varying explanatory 
variables assumed to be strictly exogenous,  jt v is a vector of the independently and identically 
distributed errors.  Stacking the data for an individual according to time, and then stacking all 
individuals, and combining the data into W= [X:D] yields  v W y + = β . 
   18
which is inconsistent with the theory. 
 
The results from estimating eq. (III) are less satisfactory.  Although the coefficient of 
the nontradable TFP,  3 η , appears significant and negative in almost all cases, the 
remaining coefficients are of the wrong sign, or not statistically different from zero.  
Residuals from most regressions do not pass the AR(2) tests so well.   
 
4B. Dynamic panel data estimation  
In this section, we estimate eq. (I) - (IV) in levels, using one- and two-step GMM 
(Arellano and Bond 1991) and combined GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Blundell and Bond 1998).  The standard errors and tests are based on the robust 
variance matrix.  In order to determine the proper lag length, we estimate equations 
with different combinations of the lag structure of the  jt x   matrix. Among our 
experiments, we choose to look at the results where residuals pass both the Sargan
20 
and AR(2) test, and fail the AR(1) test.
21 
 
When we estimate eq. (I), we choose the results generated by the two-step GMM 
estimation with one lag on relative price, tradable capital-output ratio, and 
                                                 
20 The Sargan (1958, 1988) test tests the over-identifying restrictions.  That is, if   J A  is optimal for any 
given  j Z , then under the null hypothesis that the instruments in Z  are exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated 
with the individual effect  1 η  ), the test statistic is 
2
1 1










∑ ∑ . 
21 If the AR(1) model is mean-stationary, then  jt y Δ  are uncorrelated with  1 η , which suggests that 
1 , − Δ t j y  can be used as instruments in the levels equations (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and 
Bond 1998).   19
nontradable TFP, and two lags on nontradable capital-output ratio and tradable TFP, 
 respectively (Table 9).  Under such specifications of instruments in GMM estimators, 
the residuals pass all diagnostic tests well.  All the estimated coefficients have the 
expected signs; although the tradable capital-output ratio  ) ( 1 δ  and  TFP  ) ( 3 δ  are 
insignificant.   
 
We follow the same lag selection procedure described above to estimate eq. (II) - (IV) 
(Table 9).  The coefficient that appears consistent with the theory is the one on 
nontradable TFP, which is negative and statistically different from zero throughout eq. 
(II) and (III).  The remaining coefficients, such as the ones on investment-output ratio 
( 1 η ) and on relative price differential ( 1 ζ ), do not have the expected signs; the 
coefficients of tradable TFP in eq. (II) and (III), are either insignificant (p-value=0.23), 
or negative (-0.04).  
 
For combined GMM estimation (Table 10), the results are generally similar to the 
GMM estimation with one exception.  The estimated coefficient on relative price 
differential, which is  1 ζ  in eq. (IV), is negative and significant with residuals passing 
all the diagnostic tests.  Thus, China is observed a correct direction in the change in 
the relative prices - assuming that the law of one price for tradable goods hold, then, 
for China, during its fast growing 1985 – 2000 period, the higher the relative price of 
nontradable goods, the lower the real exchange rate would become.   
 
5. CONCLUSION  
The paper extends the Asea and Mendoza (1994) setting to consider asymmetric 
productivity shocks across sectors.  Testing this model on Chinese Regional Data aid 
of non-stationary panel data techniques, it shows that eq. (I) of our extended Asea and   20
Mendoza (1994) model is a reasonable empirical representation of the Chinese 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. The static panel data model seems mis-specified as it left 
out all the dynamics, and the best results are, as expected, from the dynamic one.  
This can be seen by looking at the Sargan test, which suggests that the instruments are 
exogenous.  In fact, Hall and Urga (1998) show that when T is small and J is large, the 
GMM estimator is an efficient estimator, especially when taking the first differences 
or orthogonal deviations to eliminate the fixed effects.  In addition, the combined two-
step GMM estimation shows that China has managed to keep its real exchange rate 
appreciated while its growth rate is respectably high. 
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TABLES 
Table 1    Pooled (Total) regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   0.75**  1 γ  
 
0.15  1 η  
 
-0.15**  1 ς   -0.58** 
 (0.01)  (0.63)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
2 δ   -0.78**  2 γ  
 
-0.04  2 η  
 
-0.31**  -  - 
    (0.00)    (0.91)    (0.00)  -  - 
3 δ  
 
0.60*  3 γ  
 
-0.07  3 η  
 
-0.10** -  - 
 (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.03) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.92**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   0.79**  Constant   0.37**  Constant   0.13  Constant   2.54** 
   (0.00)     (0.05)     (0.41)     (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  4.04**  AR(1) test  4.44**  AR(1) test  4.29**  AR(1) test  25.13** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
AR(2) test   3.97**  AR(2) test   4.14**  AR(2) test   4.03**  AR(2) test   16.01** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
 
 
Table 2     OLS on differences regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   0.44  1 γ  
 
0.70**  1 η  
 
0.19**  1 ζ   -0.02 
 (0.32)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.69) 
2 δ   -0.88**  2 γ  
 
0.66*  2 η  
 
-0.04**  -  - 
    (0.00)    (0.08)    (0.00)  -  - 
3 δ  
 
0.42  3 γ  
 
-0.31**  3 η  
 
-0.28** -  - 
 (0.36)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-1.06**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   -0.02**  Constant   -0.00  Constant   -0.01**  Constant   -0.07** 
   (0.01)    (0.69)    (0.01)    (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  -1.89*  AR(1) test  -1.61  AR(1) test  -1.23  AR(1) test  -3.83** 
   (0.06)     (0.11)     (0.22)     (0.00) 
AR(2) test   1.96  AR(2) test   0.67  AR(2) test   0.61  AR(2) test   -2.73** 
   (0.05)    (0.51)    (0.54)    (0.01) 
 
Notes: 1) The figures in parentheses refer to p-values; 2) Statistical significance at 5% 
and 10% levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
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Table 3    Least squares dummy variables (LSDV) regression using 
individual dummies in the OLS regression 
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   1.19**  1 γ  
 
0.95**  1 η  
 
0.09  1 ζ   -0.68** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00) 
2 δ   -0.68**  2 γ  
 
0.75**  2 η  
 
-0.36**  -  - 
    (0.00)    (0.01)    (0.00)  -  - 
3 δ  
 
1.05**  3 γ  
 
-0.20**  3 η  
 
-0.13** -  - 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.87**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   0.54**  Constant   0.07  Constant   0.86**  Constant   2.64** 
   (0.00)    (0.67)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  3.70**  AR(1) test  4.19**  AR(1) test  4.27**  AR(1) test  19.47** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
AR(2) test   3.21**  AR(2) test   3.76**  AR(2) test   3.15**  AR(2) test   10.05** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
 
 
Table 4   Within-groups regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   1.19**  1 γ  
 
0.95**  1 η  
 
0.09  1 ζ   -0.68** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00) 
2 δ   -0.68**  2 γ  
 
0.75**  2 η  
 
-0.36**  -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) -  - 
3 δ  
 
1.05**  3 γ  
 
-0.20**  3 η  
 
-0.13** -  - 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.87**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   -  Constant   -  Constant   -  Constant   - 
   -     -     -     - 
Trend no Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  3.70**  AR(1) test  4.19**  AR(1) test  4.27**  AR(1) test  20.05** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
AR(2) test   3.21**  AR(2) test   3.76**  AR(2) test   3.15**  AR(2) test   10.82** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
 
Notes: 1) The figures in parentheses refer to p-values; 2) Statistical significance at 5% 
and 10% levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
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Table 5   Between-groups regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   0.25  1 γ  
 
-0.00  1 η  
 
0.09  1 ζ   -0.08 
 (0.68)  (1.00)  (0.66)    (0.52) 
2 δ   -0.40  2 γ  
 
-0.02  2 η  
 
0.12  -  - 
 (0.22)  (0.98)  (0.71) -  - 
3 δ  
 
0.19  3 γ  
 
-0.03  3 η  
 
-0.04 -  - 
 (0.80)  (0.78)  (0.72) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.48  - - - - -  - 
  (0.21)  - - - - -  - 
Constant   0.47  Constant   0.11  Constant   0.23  Constant   2.66** 
   (0.32)     (0.77)     (0.45)     (0.00) 
Trend No Trend no Trend  no  Trend  no 
AR(1) test  -  AR(1) test  -  AR(1) test  -  AR(1) test  - 
   -     -     -     - 
AR(2) test   -  AR(2) test   -  AR(2) test   -  AR(2) test   - 
   -     -     -     - 
 
 
Table 6   GLS using within/between-groups regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   1.14**  1 γ  
 
0.80**  1 η  
 
-0.01  1 ζ   -0.63** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.83)  (0.00) 
2 δ   -0.70**  2 γ  
 
0.59**  2 η  
 
-0.34**  -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
3 δ  
 
1.00**  3 γ  
 
-0.18**  3 η  
 
-0.13** -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.88**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   0.65**  Constant   0.31**  Constant   0.69**  Constant   2.53** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Trend No Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  13.96**  AR(1) test  17.94**  AR(1) test  15.64**  AR(1) test  22.84** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
AR(2) test   9.22**  AR(2) test   10.64**  AR(2) test   7.33**  AR(2) test   13.51** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
 
Notes: 1) The figures in parentheses refer to p-values; 2) Statistical significance at 5% 
and 10% levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
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Table 7   GLS using OLS residuals   
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   1.13**  1 γ  
 
0.79**  1 η  
 
-0.01  1 ζ   -0.64** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.65)  (0.00) 
2 δ   -0.70**  2 γ  
 
0.59**  2 η  
 
-0.34**  -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
3 δ  
 
0.99**  3 γ  
 
-0.18**  3 η  
 
-0.13** -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.88**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   0.65**  Constant   0.31**  Constant   0.66**  Constant   2.52** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  14.22**  AR(1) test  18.00**  AR(1) test  15.84**  AR(1) test  22.03** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
AR(2) test   9.49**  AR(2) test   10.70**  AR(2) test   7.58**  AR(2) test   12.60** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
 
 
Table 8   Maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) obtained by iterating the 
GLS procedure 
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Coefficient   Eq. (III)  Coefficient   Eq. (IV) 
1 δ   1.15**  1 γ  
 
0.88**  1 η  
 
0.04  1 ζ   -0.65** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.00) 
2 δ   -0.69**  2 γ  
 
0.68**  2 η  
 
-0.35**  -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
3 δ  
 
1.01**  3 γ  
 
-0.19**  3 η  
 
-0.13** -  - 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.88**  - - - - - - 
  (0.00)  - - - - - - 
Constant   0.64**  Constant   0.30**  Constant   0.84**  Constant   2.52** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Trend no Trend no Trend no Trend no 
AR(1) test  13.44**  AR(1) test  16.15**  AR(1) test  14.51**  AR(1) test  21.89** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
AR(2) test   8.68**  AR(2) test   8.66**  AR(2) test   5.99**  AR(2) test   12.44** 
   (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
 
Notes: 1) The figures in parentheses refer to p-values; 2) Statistical significance at 5% 
and 10% levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
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Table 9   One- or two-step GMM regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Lag  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Lag  Coefficient   Eq.  (III) Lag Coefficient    Eq.  (IV)  Lag 
1 δ   0.56 1  1 γ  
 
0.60 1  1 η  
 
0.21** 1  1 ζ   0.08* 1 
  (0.40)       (0.18)       (0.00)       (0.08)   
2 δ   -0.95** 2  2 γ  
 
0.57 2  2 η  
 
-0.04** 1  -  -  - 
  (0.00)       (0.23)       (0.01)     -  -  - 
3 δ  
 
0.56 2  3 γ  
 
-0.31** 1  3 η  
 
-0.19** 2  -  -  - 
  (0.42)       (0.00)       (0.07)     -  -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.98**  1 -  -  - -  -  - -  -  - 
  (0.00)                    
Constant   0.03    Constant   -0.00    Constant   0.01    Constant   -0.05**   
   (0.75)       (0.99)       (0.74)       (0.00)   
Trend no    Trend no    Trend yes    Trend  no  
1 or 2-step  2-step     1 or 2-step  2-step     1 or 2-step  1-step     1 or 2-step  2-step    
Sargan test  25.19     Sargan test  28.55     Sargan test  104.00     Sargan test  29.95    
   (1.00)        (1.00)        (0.48)        (1.00)    
AR(1) test  -1.62*     AR(1) test  -1.23     AR(1) test  -2.25**     AR(1) test  -3.64**    
   (0.10)        (0.22)        (0.02)        (0.00)    
AR(2) test   1.41     AR(2) test   -0.02     AR(2) test   -1.43     AR(2) test   -0.29    
   (0.16)        (0.98)        (0.15)        (0.77)    
 
 
Table 10   One- or two-step combined GMM regression  
Coefficient   Eq. (I)  Lag  Coefficient   Eq. (II)  Lag  Coefficient   Eq.  (III) Lag Coefficient    Eq.  (IV)  Lag 
1 δ   0.15 1  1 γ  
 
0.49 1  1 η  
 
0.20** 1  1 ζ   -0.12** 1 
  (0.56)       (0.13)       (0.00)       (0.04)   
2 δ   -0.64** 1  2 γ  
 
0.47 1  2 η  
 
-0.04** 1  -  -  - 
  (0.00)       (0.19)       (0.04)     -  -  - 
3 δ  
 
0.08 1  3 γ  
 
-0.27** 1  3 η  
 
-0.12* 1  -  -  - 
  (0.74)       (0.00)       (0.07)     -  -  - 
4 δ  
 
-0.71**  1 -  -  - -  -  - -  -  - 
  (0.00)                    
Constant   0.22**    Constant   0.01    Constant   0.15**    Constant   0.28**   
   (0.02)       (0.86)       (0.00)       (0.00)   
Trend yes  Trend  no  Trend  yes  Trend  no   
1 or 2-step  1-step     1 or 2-step  1-step     1 or 2-step  1-step     1 or 2-step  2-step    
Sargan test  337.00     Sargan test  495.30     Sargan test  272.60     Sargan test  29.94    
   (1.00)        (0.19)        (1.00)        (1.00)    
AR(1) test  -1.63*     AR(1) test  -1.23     AR(1) test  -1.79*     AR(1) test  -3.83**    
   (0.10)        (0.21)        (0.07)        (0.00)    
AR(2) test   0.82     AR(2) test   1.03     AR(2) test   0.59     AR(2) test   -0.07    
   (0.41)        (0.30)        (0.56)        (0.94)    
 
Notes: 1) The figures in parentheses refer to p-values; 2) Statistical significance at 5% 
and 10% levels are denoted by ** and * respectively. 
 